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Connection setup in software-defined networks (SDN) requires considerable amounts
of processing, communication, and memory resources. Attackers can target SDN con-
trollers defense mechanism based on a proof-of-work protocol. This thesis proposes
a new protocol to protect controllers against such attacks, shows implementation of
the system and analyze the its performance. The key characteristics of this protocol,
namely its one-way operation, its requirement for freshness in proofs of work, its ad-
justable difficulty, its ability to work withmultiple network providers, and its use of
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Software-defined networking (SDN) is an attracting architecture that decouples
the network control and forwarding functions, and the underlying infrastructure, en-
abling the network control to be prpgrammable. Therefore, the SDN is centrally
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Figure 1.1. Architecture of software-defined network.
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The high-level architecture of SDN presented by Open Networking Foundation
(ONF), an organization dedicated to the development and standarization of SDN, is
shown in Figure 1.1 [3].
• Infrastructure layer: Also named as data plane, it consists forwarding elements,
such as phisical and virtual switches. These switches are accessible via an open
interface to switch and forwarded packets.
• Control layer: Also named as control plane, it consists software-based con-
trollers. The SDN controller is a logical centralized entity summarizing the
network state for applications and translating application requirements to low-
level rules.
• Application layer: It mainly consists of end-user applications.
1.2 Motivation
SDN switches match incoming traffic against a set of flow rules that have been
installed by the controller. For new connections that have no matching rules, the
switch forwards the flow information to the SDN controller. The controller then
makes a routing decision and informs all switches along the path so that they can
install a matching rule in their flow tables.
The ability to control the routing of individual flows in SDN is convenient for
traffic management in data centers [4], for implementing virtualized network functions
[5], and for offering customized network services [6]. A critical aspect of SDN is
the operation and performance of the controller, which is a (logically or physically)
centralized component and needs to handle routing decisions for all traffic through
the network [7]. To ensure that these controllers have a suitable level of performance
and reliability, a variety of distributed designs have been proposed [8, 9].
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Despite the robust designs for SDN controllers, these systems represent attractive
targets for malicious attackers. The basic operation of SDN exhibits an imbalance
between the small amount of work that is necessary (sending of a packet with a
new 5-tuple) to trigger the large amount to trigger large amount of work that is
then performed by the SDN controller (route computation and setup of flow rules in
switches). An attacker can exploit this imbalance by simply sending crafted flows,
triggering a route computation with each packet and effectively overloading the SDN
controller and filling flow tables in switches.
To level this imbalance, we introduce the Controller Protection Protocol (CPP),
which requires systems wanting to connect through an SDN network to commit re-
sources before an SDN controller commits resources for route computation and setup.
In our case, the connecting system needs to include a proof-of-work (POW) [10] with
the initial packet of a connection. The SDN controller can verify the correctness of
the POW easily and thus discard attack traffic with invalid POWs with low overhead.
Using this approach, an attacker needs to dedicate a large amount of computational
resources in order to send large amounts of attack traffic that triggers route computa-
tion on the SDN controller, thus making an attack potentially prohibitively expensive.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis addresses the how to defense flood attack towards control plane of
SDN. First, we review related researches about security issues in SDN and come up
with the idea of using proof-of-work to solve flood attack targeting controllers in
SDN. Then, we study different algorithms and design some experiment to find out
the proper one used in SDN. Finally, we propose the entire system to implement the
initial idea.
The main contributions are as follows:
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• Propose a one-way transmission of POW to provide necessary efficiency for
operation in SDN.
• Design the entire system applying the POW to protect controllers in SDN
against flood attack.
• Devise the experiments and applications to implement CPP.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses related
work. The problem of using proof-of-work in network protocols is explained in more
detail in Chapter 3. The design of Controller Protection Protocol, including the design
of the proof-of-work and the communication protocol, is described in Chapter 4.
The evaluation results showing effectiveness of CPP is in Chapter 5, and Chapter 6




2.1 Attacks against Controllers in SDN
Since the SDN seperate the control plane from the data plane, the data plane have
to ask the control plane for flow rules if the coming packets don’t match the current
flow table. Therefore, it usually takes more time to handle the initial packet than
the next ones. The attacker can easily detect SDN by measuring the difference of
response time for new-flow and exist-flow [11]. After successfully detecting SDN, the
attacker can make the flooding attack towards the controller, causing denial-of-service
in SDN.
2.2 DDoS Defense in SDN
SDN controller attack is conceptually similar to SYN flood attack on servers [12].
When a client need to establish a new connection to the server, TCP three-way
handshake is applied. The steps are as follows:
1. The client sends a SYN message to request a new connection.
2. The server replies a SYN-ACK message to the client to acknowlege the client
that the request is received.
3. The client sends a ACK message back to server for the SYN-ACK message. The
connection than is established.
To make a denial-of-service attack, the attacker can send traffic to server requesting
TCP connectio without responding the ACK message in step 3. Or, the attacker can
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spoof the IP address, letting the server send SYN-ACK to the falsified IP address so
that the server cannot get the responce. Therefore, the server has to keep a lot of
half-open-connections causing depletion of resourses and denial of legitimate requests.
There is an effective solution to protecting servers through SYN cookies [13].
When the server receives the TCP SYN packet, the server sends a TCP SYN-ACK
packet back to the client with a structed sequence number since the initial sequence
number is chosen by the sender. The sequece number, i.e., the SYN cookie is structed
according to the maximum segment size that the server uses to store the SYN queue
entry and the information of the SYN packet, i.e., the IP address and port number
of the client, and the timestamp. When the server get the ACK packet from the
client, the server can retrieve the information from the acknowlege number which is
related to the SYN-ACK sequence number, and than setup the conneciotn. By using
SYN cookies, the servers need not keep the half-open-connetions so the flood attack
cannot exhaut the resources of the server. This approach is suitable for web requests
since the exchange can be elegantly combined with the Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) connection setup.
Avant-Guard is proposed to solve data-to-control plane saturation attack [14].
One part of this design, called connection migration, is using the similar approach as
SYN cookies. In our work, however, we cannot use such an approach since multiple
networks are along the path from sender to receiver and multiple partial round-trips
would be necessary for connection setup using two-way communication.
Heuristics to detect attacks based on traffic volume have been proposed to protect
from SYN attacks [15] and other network attacks [16,17]. Recently, a similar, volume-
based protection approach was proposed for software-defined networks [18]. This
work is difficult to implement in practice since it requires that all requesting hosts be
categorized based on trust and connection volume thresholds be established a priori.
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2.3 Proof of Work
Proof-of-work is a mechanism that established trust explicitly by requiring the
requesting entity to perform work, i.e., commit computational resources, to show its
sincerity [10]. Proof-of-work has been used before to protect network protocols [19],
but may require multiple exchanges between the communicating entities (e.g., to
exchange the challenge and to set difficulty set). Our work focuses on a one-way
POW protocol that does not require time-consuming parameter exchanges. Proof-of-
work has been argued to not work in the context of unsolicited email (spam) reduction
since it poses an undue burden on some legitimate senders [20]. As a response, the
use of reputation has been proposed to make POW work [21]. More recently, in the





The problem that our work aims to solve is as follows: Given that an SDN network
by design needs to invest considerable resources to set up a network path, how can be
ensured that the entity initiating the connections is required to commit a comparable
(or higher) amount of resources before the connection is established? Before describ-
ing our solution in Chapter 4, we review the operation of SDN, describe attacks on
SDN controllers, and formally state the security model underlying our work. Exam-
ples discussed in this section are based on the simple topology shown in Figure 3.1.
3.1 Connection Setup in SDN and Attack
A new connection is established in a software-defined network whenever a packet
arrives at the network edge with a five-tuple (i.e., source and destination address,






Figure 3.1. Simple topology of example software-defined network.
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Figure 3.2. Space-time diagram of network interactions during connection setup in
a software-defined network (topology from Figure 3.1, single SDN network provider,
uni-directional communication).
match any rule that has been previously installed in that switch. The steps that are
then performed are as follows (see space-time diagram in Figure 3.2):
1. The switch that receives the new packet forwards the five-tuple information to
the SDN controller (“new connection notification” in Figure 3.2).
2. The SDN controller computes a suitable path for this new traffic through the
SDN. This computation is performed by an SDN application that is accessed
through the north-bound interface of the controller. For simplicity of discussion,
we consider the SDN controller and SDN application a single unit (since they
are implemented on the same physical device). Depending on the algorithm
used, the size of the SDN, and the constraints imposed by policies and other
existing connections, the path computation may require a considerable amount
of processing on the controller.
3. Once the path for the new connection has been determined, the switches along
that path are informed (“forwarding rule” in Figure 3.2). Then, a new rule
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matching the connection’s five-tuple (or a more general rule for forwarding traf-
fic aggregates) is installed in the switch table directing that traffic to the ap-
propriate output port (“new flow table entry added” in Figure 3.2).
4. Once the path through the SDN has been configured, the original packet is
forwarded by the switch that initially received it. All later packets of the con-
nection are forwarded directly by the SDN switch without involvement of the
SDN controller (until the flow table entry for that connection expires and is
removed).
It is apparent from the above listing that the amount of resources committed
by the SDN for any new connection involves (1) communication bandwidth between
switches and the controller, (2) processing on the controller, and (3) memory in the
switch tables. This resource commitment is triggered by merely sending a packet that
has new five-tuple values (i.e., a 64-byte packet with an IP and TCP header and no
payload).
A malicious attacker can easily launch a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on an
SDN by sending a large number of packets with different, new five-tuple values.
This type of attack is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Each packet is handled as a new
connection and requires the connection setup steps discussed above. Sending attack
packets requires very little commitment on the attacker side. However, each packet
triggers a considerable resource commitment on the SDN side, thus leading to resource
exhaustion. Depending on the configuration of the SDN, this resource exhaustion may
occur either on the control links between switches and the controller, on the processor
of the SDN controller, or on the state tables in the switches. The effect of the attack
is that legitimate connection requests cannot be processed (and their traffic cannot
be forwarded).
10
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Figure 3.3. Space-time diagram of denial-of-service attack on software-defined
network controller (topology from Figure 3.1, single SDN network provider, uni-
directional communication, packet forward through SDN omitted for readability).
3.2 Security Model
Before arguing the design to protect SDN controller, we formalize the discussion
by defining a security model.
3.2.1 Security Requirements
SR1 An attacker cannot set up a connection through the SDN network without
committing computational resources.
SR2 An attacker is not able to use resources committed for a previous or different
successfully established connection for a new, different connection.




We assume the attackers have the following capabilities and limitations:
AC1 An attacker can send any type of traffic, including any connection setup requests
with real or fake proofs of work.
AC2 An attacker cannot solve a proof of work except by performing the work.
AC3 An attacker cannot predict future values of a true random number generator.
3.3 Performance Requirement
In addition to secure operation, it is also important that CPP achieves efficient
operation. We aim to achieve the following performance requirements:
PR1 A correct connection needs to be established in a single pass.
PR2 An incorrect proof of work needs to be identified with little computational
resources.
PR3 A correct proof of work needs to require resources that are comparable to (or
higher than) those committed by an SDN controller for settings up a connection
through the SDN network.




CONTROLLER PROTECTION PROTOCOL DESIGN
4.1 Main Idea
The main idea for the Controller Protection Protocol is to use a proof of work
during connection setup. This proof of work requires the end-system requesting the
connection to commit considerable resources before resources are committed on the
side of the SDN controller. When an attacker sends large numbers of connection
requests (without committing the resources to include valid proofs of work in each
packet), then these packets can be identified and discarded with very little overhead.
The connection setup process based on the Controller Protection Protocol is shown
in Figure 4.1. This space time diagram is based on the topology in Figure 3.1 and
shows the changes compared to the standard SDN connection setup process shown
in Figure 3.2. In CPP, the end-system first computes a proof of work (details on the
parameters for this computation are described in Section 4.4). The result from this
computation, i.e., the proof of work, is included in the first packet sent by the new
connection (e.g., the TCP SYN packet). When the first SDN switch encounters the
packet from this new connection, it forwards the connection information, including
the proof of work, to the SDN controller. The controller then checks the validity
of the proof of work before performing path computation or any other action. In
case the proof-of-work validation fails, the controller discards the packet and the
connection is not set up (i.e., no path computation takes plane and no forwarding
rule is installed in the SDN switches). In case the proof-of-work validation succeeds,
the path computation and forwarding rule installation is performed as in conventional
13
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Figure 4.1. Space-time diagram of network interactions during connection setup
in a software-defined network using Controller Protection Protocol (topology from
Figure 3.1, single SDN network provider, uni-directional communication).
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Figure 4.2. Space-time diagram of denial-of-service attack on software-defined net-
work controller using Controller Protection Protocol (topology from Figure 3.1, single
SDN network provider, uni-directional communication).
SDN. Once the connection has been established, later packets of that connection do
not contain a proof of work, but are forwarded by the SDN switches as in conventional
SDN.
If an end-system wants to launch a denial-of-service attack on the SDN controller
(as shown previously in Figure 3.3), then there are two possible approaches:
• Attack with valid proofs of work: If the attacker includes valid proofs of work,
then the SDN controller performs the connection setup as described above.
However, the design of the proof of work in CPP is such that generating a
valid proof of work requires considerable resources on the end-system initiating
the connection request. Therefore, an attacker would need a lot of (costly)
computational power to launch a successful attack on the SDN controller.
• Attack with invalid proofs of work: If the attacker does not include valid proofs
of work, which is a much cheaper approach, then the SDN controller can de-
tect this lack of a valid proof of work during the verification step. Since the
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proof-of-work validation fails, no path computation or flow setup resources are
committed by the router then. The denial-of-service attack thus fails and only
consumes bandwidth resources to forward this initial attack traffic (which can
be throttled with conventional DoS protection mechanisms if necessary). This
scenario is shown in Figure 4.2.
A variant of this protocol is to check the proof of work on the first SDN switch
(i.e., before sending a connection notification to the SDN controller). This variant
would reduce intra-SDN communication and thus exhibit even more resilience to
attacks. However, most practical SDN switches do not have much compute func-
tionality beyond simply matching of packet headers to flow table entries. Thus, the
implementation of this variant is not practical in current SDN. However, if future
SDN employ switches with more processing capabilities (or dedicated functions to
implement CPP), then the proof-of-work verification can be performed by the SDN
switch that encounters the first packet from a new connection.
4.2 System Architecture
One of the key requirements for any connection setup protocol is that it operates
in a one-way fashion. An implication of this requirement is that the proof of work
needs to be calculated by the end-system initiating the connection before it is known
which path the packet takes through the Internet and which network providers are
encountered. This lack of knowledge of the path implies that the proof of work cannot
be customized to any specific network operator’s requirements. Since it also cannot
be expected that a network provider wants to trust any other provider to check the
proof of work on its behalf, we need to design a proof of work that is acceptable to
all network providers.
One approach to using a single proof of work for all providers is to define a set
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Figure 4.3. System architecture of Controller Protection Protocol with central Con-
troller Protection Protocol Authority that distributes current CPP parameters to
SDN controllers for verification of proofs of work in connection requests.
However, if these parameters are fixed (or change in a predictable fashion), then an
attacker can stockpile proofs of work, which violates security requirement SR3.
Therefore, we introduce a Controller Protection Protocol Authority (CPPA),
which creates and distributes global CPP parameters. These parameters are based
on a true random number generator and change over time to ensure that the fresh-
ness requirement is met. The CPPA provides the currently active parameter set for
pull queries by SDN controllers. Alternatively, the currently active parameter set
can be pushed to all SDN controllers through multicast or other content distribution
mechanisms. In practice, the Controller Protection Protocol Authority can operate
as a logically centralized, but physically distributed system to improve performance,
reliability, and resilience to denial-of-service attacks.
The use of a global, logically centralized Controller Protection Protocol Authority
may seem like an expensive requirement. However, the CPPA simplifies the problem
of needing to establish trust between network providers by acting as trusted interme-
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diary. There are several other, widely deployed network protocol that require central
coordination (e.g., Domain Name System (DNS) [24]).
The resulting system architecture for the Controller Protection Protocol is shown
in Figure 4.3. The figure shows the the Controller Protection Protocol Author-
ity creates parameters as described below in Section 4.3.1. These parameters are
distributed—either through push or through pull mechanisms—to all CPP-enabled
components, i.e., end-systems and SDN controllers. (SDN switches do not need to be
modified for CPP.) The operation of the Controller Protection Protocol is described
in the following section.
4.3 Controller Protection Protocol Operation
This section discusses CPP in detail.
4.3.1 Parameter Distribution
The parameters that are necessary for correct operation of CPP are:
• Random base r: This parameter is a random number generated by the CPPA.
This random base is used in the proof-of-work calculation and ensures that
proofs of work are only considered valid while this base is active.
• Proof complexity c: This parameter is a number indicating the difficulty of
the proof of work (see Section 4.4). Since the computational capabilities of
processors continues to grow due to improvements in semiconductor technology
(as projected by Moore’s law [25]), this parameter enables CPP to adapt over
time. (The computational power of SDN controllers also grows with Moore’s
law, but other resources, such as flow table entries in SDN switches, may not
grow as quickly. Therefore, it is convenient to decouple these resources from
each other through this explicit parameter.)
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The parameter set (r, c) needs to change over time to ensure freshness of proofs
and to adapt complexity. We therefore divide time into epochs during which a given
parameter set is valid. We define ∆t as the epoch duration and epoch n is active
during the time interval [(n − 1) · ∆t, n · ∆t). Any given time t falls into epoch
bt/(∆t)c + 1. For simplicity of notation, we denote rt as parameter r that is valid
during the epoch in which time t falls. Similarly, we define ct. Furthermore, we define
rt−1 and ct−1 as the parameters that were valid in the previous epoch.
The Controller Protection Protocol Authority then distributes (rt, ct) during the
current epoch. To aid with transient behavior, as we explain below, it is also necessary
to distribute the previous set of parameters (rt−1, ct−1). The epoch duration needs to
be chosen long enough to ensure that the parameters from the current (and previous)
epoch can be distributed throughout the Internet. However, the epoch should not be
too long to avoid stockpiling of proofs of work. We envision that ∆t values in the
order to tens of seconds to minutes are good values for a practical implementation.
4.3.2 Proof of Work Generation
The proof of work that is included in the connection request must be such that it
cannot be reused for a different connection request (security requirement SR 2). A
straightforward way of ensuring that this requirement is met is to make the proof of
work “self-certifying.” That is, the flow information itself (i.e., the connection 5-tuple
f) is used as a parameter for the proof of work computation. Thus, a proof of work
that is valid for the parameters of one connection does not match the parameters of
another connection since the connection 5-tuple is different.
In addition, the proof of work is based on the CPPA parameters. Thus, the proof
of work for connection f at time t, powft , is computed by a function p with the
following parameters:
powft = p(f, rt, ct). (4.1)
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The details of the function p are provided in Section 4.4.
4.3.3 Proof of Work Verification
The proof of work verification step is a straightforward complement to the proof
of work generation step. A function v is used to compute a binary output valid
indicating if the proof of work is valid. For a matching proof of work, the result is
v(f, rt, ct, pow
f
t ) = true. (4.2)
However, if the flow information does not match (e.g., reuse of proof of work powf
′
t
from flow f ′), then, with high probability,
v(f, rt, ct, pow
f ′
t ) = false. (4.3)
Similarly, the verification step fails with high probability for different CPPA param-
eters (r′, c′).
Since information cannot propagate instantaneously in networks, there are situa-
tions where epoch parameters have propagated to one part of the network, but not
to another. If a connection is initiated from the part of the network with old param-
eters and reaches the part of the network with new parameters (or vice versa), the
verification set fails. To avoid problems during this transient period, the SDN con-
troller performs a second verification step (if the first one fails) with the parameters
from the previous epoch: v(f, rt−1, ct−1, pow
f
t−1). Thus the window during which a
proof of work can be used becomes 2 · ∆t in practice. (There is also a complemen-
tary situation where the connection is initiated from the part of the network that
has the new parameters. However, if this connection then travels towards the part
of the network with the old parameters, it can be assumed that the new parameter
values travel equally fast through flooding or multicast and thus arrive before this
connection setup request needs to be handled.)
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Note that the failure of the verification is based on a probabilistic argument since
there is always a chance that an attacker may guess the correct pow value. However,
as we see below, the chances for a randomly successful attack are exceedingly small
and do not pose practical problems.
4.3.4 Multiple Network Providers
A typical end-to-end Internet connection request needs to traverse multiple sub-
networks belonging to different network providers. The design of CPP can accom-
modate such multiple network providers easily. The proof of work sent in the first
packet of a connection is independent of a specific provider and the verification step
in Equation 4.2 succeeds for any provider.
Since each provider can verify the proof of work independently, there is no need
for providers to trust each other to verify traffic on ones behalf. As long as each
provider trusts that the Controller Protection Protocol Authority to provide a valid
parameter set, no further trust relationships are necessary.
4.4 Proof-of-Work Design
A key question for our design is what proof of work function to use. Dwork
and Naor proposed three POW functions based on mathematical hard problems [10].
The first function is finding the square root of an arbitrary x modulo a prime p,
which cost at least log(p) steps to solve and only a simple multiplication to verify.
However, to guarantee the existence of the solution, the parameter p and x cannot
be chosen randomly, which requires two-way communication to be implemented. The
other two functions are based on breaking cryptographic signatures, which may also
encounter the same issue as the first function and need two-way communication to
be implemented. Abadi proposed a memory-bound POW [26]. The computation
time of the function is based on memory latencies, which have much smaller variance
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than CPU speed. Coelho proposed a protocol based on the Merkle tree [27], which
consumes constant effort on solution and verification. However, the verification of
this protocol needs multiple cryptographic hash computations, which may be too
demanding for an SDN controller.
In CPP, we use an approach similar to previous proofs of work (e.g., such as in
bitcoin mining [22]) that can be verified with a single cryptographic hash computation.
We require that find an input to an cryptographic hash computation that generates
an output starting with a predetermined number of zeros. Since cryptographic hash
functions are one-way functions, the entity generating the proof of work has to try
by “brute force” to find a suitable input. This search process is on average time
consuming and thus requires dedication of computational resources (i.e., “work”).
The verification, in contrast, is very simple since the verifier only needs to do a single
computations to see if an input (i.e., “proof”) yields an output starting with the
required number of zeros.
Since we need to customize the proof of work challenge for different connections,
epochs, and difficulty levels, we integrate these parameters into the proof of work p
(from Equation 4.1) as follows:
p(f, rt, ct) = w such that hash(f ‖ rt ‖ w) starts with ct zeros, (4.4)
where ‘‖’ denotes a concatenation operation. The work that is performed is to find a
suitable w that meets these requirements.
The verification step from Equation 4.2 is then performed as follows:
v(f, rt, ct, pow
f
t ) = if hash(f ‖ rt ‖ powft ) starts with ct zeros. (4.5)
In Section 5.2.1, we show that performing the work is significantly more compu-
tationally complex than verifying a proof and that this proportion can be adapted by
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changing parameter ct. Note that solving one given proof of work occur very quickly
depending on the choice of w in Equation 4.4. However, over multiple proofs (i.e.,
multiple connection requests), the cost averages out due to the central limit theo-
rem. Also, the probability of simply guessing a correct proof of work is 2−ct and thus
exceedingly small.
4.5 Protocol Details
The proof of work represents additional information that needs to be carried in
the first packet of a connection. While it is always possible to add new option fields or
design new headers, we have designed an elegant implementation of CPP that does not
require any header changes when using Internet Protocol (IP) [28] and Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) [29] headers.
The characteristics of the proof of work discussed above is that it is inherently
pseudo-random (non-pseudo-randomness in the proof of work could be exploited to
guess a solution more quickly). Therefore, it is possible to utilize existing header
fields that use randomized values to carry the proof of work. Specific header fields
are:
• IP identification field: This identifier field is 16 bits long and its value is chosen
by the sender. The value needs to be unique for a given connection. Since
the connection setup packet is the first packet of the connection, any value is
acceptable. Thus, this field can carry proof of work information.
• TCP sequence number: This field is 32 bits long and identifies the logical posi-
tion of the data carried in the payload in the context of the connection stream.
The sender chooses a random sequence number at connection setup time and
any value is acceptable. Thus, this field can also carry proof of work informa-
tion.
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version header length type of service total length
identification flags fragment offset
time to live protocol header checksum
source address
destination address









connection 5-tuple used to construct f
fields used for proof of work pow
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 (16 bits in IP header + 32 bits in TCP header = 48 bits total)
key
Figure 4.4. Layout of header fields in IP header and TCP header used 5-tuple flow
information and proof of work storage.
Figure 4.4 shows an illustration of a TCP/IP header. The fields that are used to
determine f are shown, as well as the fields that can carry the proof of work powf .
In a deployment of CPP, the operating system of the end-system can be modified
to use these fields accordingly. For traffic that does not use TCP as transport layer
protocol, IP options [28] can be used to carry 32 bits for CPP beyond the 16 bits in




To demonstrate the effectiveness of the Controller Protection Protocol, we discuss
how CPP meets the security requirements. Then, we show performance results from
an implementation of the proof of work component that demonstrates the computa-
tional cost relation between sender and SDN controller for different levels of difficulty.
5.1 Security Evaluation
To argue that CPP meets the security requirements stated in Section 3.2, we
revisit each security requirement:
SR1 In CPP, an attacker cannot establish a connection through an SDN since the
controller checks for valid proofs of work in all connection requests. An attacker
cannot circumvent this requirement by reusing proofs (attacker capability AC2)
since proofs of work are parameterized to the flow information and current epoch
parameters (Equations 4.1 and 4.4). The probability of a successful guess by
the attacker is 2−ct and thus so small that random proofs of work cannot be
used as an attack vector.
SR2 The parametrization of the proof of work based on flow information and current
epoch parameters requires commitment of new resources (i.e., a new proof of
work computation) for each new connection.
SR3 An attacker cannot use stockpiled proofs of work that are older than two epochs
(see Section 4.3.3). The attacker cannot predict future epoch parameters (at-
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tacker capability AC3) to pre-calculate proofs. Thus, the largest stockpile is
limited by the number of proofs that an attacker can generate and send during
this short time.
Based on these arguments, the Controller Protection Protocol meets the security
requirements to protect SDN controllers for denial-of-service attacks. One critical
aspect in this context is the relationship between the computation time committed
by the end-system and the computation time committed by the SDN controller, which
we discuss next.
5.2 Proof of Work Implementation
5.2.1 Proof of Work Evaluation
We have experimentally evaluated the proof of work component of CPP for a
number of different types of cryptographic hash functions and parameters. The ex-
perimental setup uses a 1.8 GHz Intel core i5 processor with 4GB of 1600MHz DDR3
memory. The code is written in C++ on the Xcode platform. The cryptographic hash
functions used for this evaluation are SHA-1 (from the Crypto++ library), SHA-2
(SHA-256 and SHA-512 variant, Olivier Gay’s implementation) and SHA-3 (Stephan
Brumme’s implementation).
Figure 5.1 shows the experimental processing times for generation of a proof of
work (i.e., Equation 4.4) and verification of a proof of work (i.e., Equation 4.5). As
expected, the generation time is a distribution of values based on what value of w
is chosen in Equation 4.4. Also, the generation time is significantly larger than the
verification time. Thus, the proof of work does cause the necessary commitment of
resources on the side of the end-system as stated in security requirement SR1. Also




























Figure 5.1. Distribution of generation and verification times for proofs of work in
CPP (complexity ct=10 zeroes).
average validation time [ms]
































Figure 5.2. Average generation and verification times for proofs of work in CPP
for different complexity parameters (complexity ct=[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 24]
zeroes from bottom to top).
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Table 5.1. Average of generation time and verification time of proofs of work for
different cryptographic functions and complexity parameters.
hash complexity ct
function Time (ms) 8 10 12 16 20 24
SHA-1
generation 2.48 9.78 37.73 575.6 9.4k 124.9k
verification 0.0185 0.0170 0.0169 0.0161 0.0173 0.0196
SHA-256
generation 2.04 8.54 31.71 511.0 7.88k 147.7k
verification 0.0149 0.0147 0.0147 0.0143 0.0148 0.0188
SHA-512
generation 3.23 12.99 53.84 828.3 13.3k 213.4k
verification 0.0203 0.0201 0.0196 0.0197 0.0198 0.0247
SHA3-256
generation 2.95 11.45 47.59 669.49 12.2k 160.2k
verification 0.0542 0.0614 0.0638 0.0544 0.0542 0.0467
Table 5.2. Average ratio of generation time and verification time of proofs of work
for different cryptographic functions and complexity parameters.
hash complexity ct
function 8 10 12 16 20 24
SHA-1 134 575 2.23k 35.7k 544.8k 6.37M
SHA-256 136 581 2.16k 35.7k 543.5k 7.86M
SHA-512 159 646 2.75k 42.0k 670.6k 8.64M
SHA3-256 54 186 746 12.3k 226.0k 3.43M
To explore this ratio of computation time committed during proof of work gen-
eration and proof of work verification, Figure 5.2 shows these times for a number
of different complexity value. The genaration and verification time of proof of work
with some complexity parameter values is shown in Table 5.1, and the ratio between
generation time and verification time is summarized in Table 5.2. These results show
that, depending on the choice of complexity parameter, the resource commitment on
the end-system can be a few hundred times the cost of verifying the proof of work or
many million times. Thus, performance requirement PR3 is met. Thus, CPP can be
adapted to the necessary ratio of resource commitment. Since the complexity param-
eter ct is distributed by the Controller Protection Protocol Authority, such adaptation
can be implemented with ease.
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5.2.2 Proof-of-work Implementation on End-System
Table 5.1 and table 5.2 shows the average time of verification and generation
time of different cryptographic functions. The results show that SHA3 has the lowest
ratio but the verification time is more than twice as the others. Using SHA3 to
implement CPPA will cost more on controller but the same as other cryptographic
hash functions at the attacker side. Thus, we will not use SHA3 to implement the
protocol on host. Comparing the other three, SHA-256 has the lowest verification
time but has a raletively high ratio. Therefore, we use SHA-256 to implement the
protocol on end-system.
To implement proof of work on end-system, we need to change information of each
SYN packet. According to the discription in Section 4.5, we could choose IP identifier
number or TCP sequence number. We use TCP sequence number to contain proofs
of work.
The first idea is shown in Figure 5.3. The application needs to capture the outgoing
packets, recognise the SYN packets and change the TCP sequence number to a valid
proof of work. Then, it remenbers the difference between the original sequence number
and proof of work and pairs it with the flow information. When receiving packets,
the application needs to look it up from the table according to the flow information
and then change back the relative acknowledge number according to the records.
Implementtation of this application is difficult since the system is not allowed to
change the TCP sequence number outside the kernel. So we need to change the
IP/TCP stack in kernel to implement the protocol.
The experiment is taken on Ubuntu 16.04 with kernel version of 4.4.1. By hacking
the kernel, we don’t need to record the original TCP sequence number since we
directly change the initail sequence number (ISP).
According to RFC6528, the initial sequence number is generated with the ex-
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Figure 5.3. Initial idea of implementation for CPPA protocol on host
M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the
connection-id. In kernel 4.4.1, the F() is MD5 algorithm. The sequece number is
generated in file net/core/secure seq.c. We ignore the random base rt in Equation 4.4
because we don’t implement the CPPA in this experiment. The steps of generating
a valid proof of work is shown in Figure 5.4.
1. Generate initial number i according to RFC6528.
2. Calculate SHA-256 of source IP and port, destination IP and port, and i from
step 1.
3. Check if the digest of SHA-256 meets the complexity parameter ct.
4. If the digest meets the requirement, use i as the initial sequence number. If not,
increase i by 1 and repeat step 2 - 4.
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Generate initial number
i = M + F()
Calculate
SHA2(sourse IP, sourse port, 
destination IP, destination port, i)
Check




i = i + 1
Figure 5.4. Generating proof of work in Ubuntu
We use wireshark to capture the packets and check if the system changes the initial
sequence number of every SYN packet. In Figure 5.5, we can see the information of
highlighted packet. We use hexadecimal number to be the input of SHA-256 and set
the complexity parameter c = 16, which means the requirement is 16 bits of zeros. In
Figure 5.5, the source IP is (c0a8ba8e)16, the souce port is (d1b6)16, the destination
IP and port are (68101a23)16 and (50)16 and the sequence number is (7ef34cda)16.
Figure 5.6 shows the result of SHA-256. The output of SHA-256 is beginning with
16 bits of zeros in binary form (4 zeros in hexadecimal number).
We only check the functionality of this kernel such as browsing webpages, watching
online videos and making VoIP call. To measure the delay time of this implementation
can be a further work of this experiment.
31
Figure 5.5. Wireshark in Ubuntu
Figure 5.6. Verify the proof-of-work generated in Ubuntu
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5.3 SDN Prototype Evaluation
5.3.1 Processing time of controller
We have extended a POX SDN controller to implement CPP and check incoming
connection requests for valid POWs. We created an OpenFlow network environment,
including two virtual switches and two hosts using Mininet in Virtual box with one
core of 1.8 GHz Intel core i5 processor. The network traffic with both valid and
invalid proofs of work is generated by the Python API provided in Mininet.
Table 5.3. Measurement results of processing times on SDN controller. Proof of work
uses SHA-256 with a complexity of ct=12 bits of zeros. The regular SDN controller
cannot distinguish between connection requests with valid or invalid POWs. Results
are averages with standard deviation over 1000 connection request measurements.






reception (µs) 150.97 ± 64.75 Reception (µs) 137.09 ± 56.37
no POW check (µs) 0.41 ± 0.55 POW check (µs) 41.53 ± 16.67
path computation (µs) 459.94 ± 255.94 connection drop (µs) 1.62 ± 1.18




reception (µs) 141.45 ± 47.39 reception (µs) 156.51 ± 46.406
no POW check (µs) 0.36 ± 0.74 POW check (µs) 52.90 ± 15.41
path computation (µs) 489.34 ± 172.92 path computation (µs) 488.99 ± 155.26
Total (µs) 631.15 ± 205.53 Total (µs) 698.40 ± 197.59
Table 5.3 shows the measurement results from evaluating connection setup times
on a regular SDN controller and on a CPP-enabled SDN controller. The results show
the processing time for packets with and without proofs of work. The regular SDN
controller does not perform a POW check and thus performs costly path computation
for all connection requests, totaling a connection processing time of over 600µs. The
CPP-enabled SDN controller requires around 50µs more processing time for valid
connection due to the POW check. However, invalid connection requests, i.e., those
without valid POW, that may have been sent by a DoS attacker, can be processed
in less than 200µs. In particular, the time after detecting that the POW is not valid
is less than 2µs compared to around 500 µs in a conventional controller. Thus, the
CPP-enable controller is able to protect its computational resource from DoS attacks.
In addition, but not shown here, no resources are used to communicate with switches
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or to install flow rules in switch tables after a connection is dropped due to an invalid
POW.
These results show that Controller Protection Protocol achieves the desired prop-
erties and reduces the workload significantly on SDN controllers when DoS attack
connection requests without valid proofs of work are sent.
5.3.2 Performance of controller under attacks in SDN
In this experiment, we created an OpenFlow network environment, including one
opneflow virtual switch and three hosts using GENI resourses. The topology is shown
in Figure 5.7. Host 1 launches attacks towards host 3 and host 2 is a normal user
communicating with host 3. The SYN packets attack is generated using hping3 tool.
The network traffic with valid proofs of work is generated using Python API.
Figure 5.7. Topology of experiment on GENI
Figure 5.8 to Figure 5.14 shows the traffic flows on links from host side in the
network. The packets in outgoing traffic are the SYN packets sent from the host,
which represents the new connection request the host wants to setup. The packets in
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incomming traffic contains SYN-ACK packets. Because the SYN packets are gener-
ated manually with no actual service request, the SYN-ACK packets also carry FIN
flag to terminate the following packets of this connection. Therefore, the incomming
traffic in these figures only contains SYN-ACK packets, which means the number of
packets comming into the host is the number of connections set up successfully.
Figure 5.8 to Figure 5.11 shows the traffic under the attack with different rate
in network using regular controller. The number of incomming packets in host 2
decreases at the point host 1 lauches the attack. In Figure 5.9, the incomming traffic
at host 2 is under 10 packet/s and in Figure 5.10, the incomming traffic is under
5 packet/s, which means over 90% of connections cannot be established under 3000
packet/s attack.
Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 shows the traffic under the attacks with 1000 packet/s
and 10000 packet/s towards CPP-enabled SDN controller. The incomming traffic in
host 2 is not affected when attack launches. When host 1 launches attack with 100,000
packet/s, shown in Figure 5.14, over 10 connections per second can be set up under
attack.
These results show that Controller Protection Protocol could increase the perfor-
mance of controllers under attacks, which make the attackers consume more resourses
to launch a successful DDoS attack.
Figure 5.8. Attacks to regular SDN controller (attack with 1000 packets/second)
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Figure 5.9. Attacks to regular SDN controller (attack with 2000 packets/second)
Figure 5.10. Attacks to regular SDN controller (attack with 3000 packets/second)
Figure 5.11. Attacks to regular SDN controller (attack with 10000 packets/second)
Figure 5.12. Attack to CPP-enabled SDN controller (attack with 1000 pack-
ets/second)
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Figure 5.13. Attack to CPP-enabled SDN controller(attacks with 10000 pack-
ets/second)
Figure 5.14. Flood attack to CPP-enabled SDN controller
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
Our work addresses the problem of how to protect controllers in software-defined
networks from denial-of-service attacks. Since the controller needs to commit a con-
siderable amount of computation, communication, and memory resources in the SDN
for each new connection, an attacker can easily cause such denial-of-service by flood-
ing the controller with new connection requests. Our Controller Protection Protocol
requires that new connection requests contain a proof of work that demonstrates that
the end-system requesting the new connection has already committed considerable
computational resources. As a result, an attacker would need to commit prohibitive
amounts of computational power for a successful attack.
Based on the security model presented in the thesis and the experimental results,
we are able to argue that CPP meets the requirements to protect SDN controllers
effectively.
Our Controller Protection Protocol also fulfills practical deployment aspects, such
as operating in a one-way mode, not requiring trust among network providers, and
being able to adapt the proof of work dynamically to different levels of complexity.
In addition, CPP can be implemented in the existing TCP/IP protocol stack without
requiring any new headers or header options.
The Controller Protection Protocol Authority, which is a source of a random num-
ber (i.e., parameter rt) that changes over time may be valuable to other protocols that
require “freshness.” One example is to use this information to avoid replay attacks.
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Thus, the presented work may be useful beyond its immediate application to protect
SDN controllers from denial of service attacks.
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